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I. INTRODUCTION
Reflections on the application of sovereign and individual immunities
law are especially pertinent in light of the controversy surrounding the
arrest and trial of General Augosto Pinochet in Britain, at the request of a
Spanish magistrate on charges of murder, hostage-taking, and torture
during his seventeen year rule in Chile. This commentary will briefly
review the controversy in the next section. The following sections will
discuss sovereign immunity, act of state, head of state immunity and
diplomatic immunity in connection with human rights violations. In the
final section, I will offer my recommendations.
II. THE PINOCHET CONTROVERSY
At the Spanish request and pursuant to British procedures the Lord
Chief Justice of the High Court, Queen's Bench, interpreted the applicable
United Kingdom statutes, including the United Kingdom Extradition Act of
1989, the State Immunity Act of 1978 and the Diplomatic Privileges Act of
1964. The Court held that the former dictator was "entitled to immunity as
a former sovereign from the criminal and civil process of the English
courts."' The court stated that "a former head of state is clearly entitled to
* Professor Ved P. Nanda teaches at the University of Denver.
1. In re Augosto Pinochet Ugarte, CO/4074/98, CO/4083/98 (October 28, 1998), para.
74, cited in ASIL, International Law in Brief, Vol. I, No. 4, Dec. 1998, at 2.
468 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 5:467
immunity in relation to criminal acts performed in the course of exercising
public functions." 2 In response to the argument that the crimes allegedly
committed by Pinochet were so serious that no one in the exercise of his
functions as head of state could commit such crimes, Justice Collins stated
in a separate opinion; "[T]here is in my judgment no justification for
reading any limitation based on the nature of the crimes committed into the
immunity which exists." 3
On appeal to Britain's highest court, the Juridical Committee of the
House of Lords held in a three-to-two decision that Pinochet did not enjoy
immunity as a former head of state for internationally recognized crimes.4
Lord Nicholls said; "[linternational law recognizes, of course, that the
functions of a head of state may include activities which are wrongful, even
illegal, by the law of his own state or by the laws of other states."
International law has made plain, however, that certain types of
conduct, including torture and hostage-taking, are not acceptable conduct
on the part of anyone. This applies as much to heads of state, or even
more so, as it does to everyone else; the contrary conclusion would make a
mockery of international law."' Lord Steyn stated:
The development of international law since the second world war
justifies the conclusion that by the time of the 1973 coup d'etat,
and certainly ever since, international law condemned genocide[,]
torture, hostage-taking and crimes against humanity (during an
armed conflict or in peace time) as international crimes deserving
of punishment. Given this state of international law, it seems to
me difficult to maintain that the commission of such high crimes
may amount to acts performed in the exercise of the functions of a
head of state.6
Lord Hoffmann7 concurred with the reasoning of Lord Nicholls and Lord
Steyn, while Lord Slynn8 and Lord Lloyd, 9 in separate opinions, found that
Pinochet should be granted immunity as a former head of state.
Subsequently, the United Kingdom Home Secretary, Jack Straw, who had
the last word with discretion to intervene and block the Spanish extradition
2. Id. paras. 58, 63.
3. Id. para. 80.
4. For the statements of the five Law Lords, see The Guardian Home Page (London),
Nov. 26, 1998, GRDN 004, 1998 WL 18679498, at 1-7.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Id. at 1-2.
9. The Guardian Home Page (London), Nov. 26, 1998, GRDN 004, 1998 WL
18679498, at 2-4.
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request, decided to allow the extradition proceedings against Pinochet to
proceed."° Ironically, after complaints from Pinochet's lawyers that one of
the Law Lords, Lord Hoffmann, had not disclosed his chairmanship of an
Amnesty International charity, a second panel of five Law Lords set aside
the first ruling, for Amnesty International had been allowed to present
arguments in the case. The reason for Pinochet's petition for
reconsideration was that Lord Hoffmann's links with Amnesty International
gave the appearance of possible bias. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson said in
his opinion:
If the absolute impartiality of the judiciary is to be maintained,
there must be a rule which automatically disqualifies a judge who
is involved, whether personally or as a Director of a company, in
promoting the same causes in the same organization as is a party
to the suit. There is no room for fine distinctions if Lord
Hewart's famous dictum is to be observed: it is 'of fundamental
importance that justice should not only be done, but should
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."'
Thus, a third panel of seven Law Lords reheard the Pinochet case
from scratch starting in late January and continuing for three weeks.12
Regardless of the panel's decision, the controversy created by the Pinochet
case on the scope of the immunity and the political fallout of the decision
are likely to be far-reaching, with respect to foreign policy issues between
Britain, Chile and Spain.
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Since its promulgation in 1976, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) 13 provides the sole statutory basis for United States. courts to
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over any action brought against a
foreign state defendant, its political subdivision, or its "agency or
instrumentality."14 Only under its enumerated exceptions will a foreign
state defendant lose its immunity granted under the Act. The Act is,
however, silent regarding its application to defendants who are natural
10. For an explanation of the Home Secretary's decision, see < http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/
english/uk/newsid3l000/231438.-stm >.
11. House of Lords In re Pinochet, Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the
Case, Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, <http:www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk
/pa1ld1999899/djudgntl-jd990115/pinoOl.htm>, at 10.
12. See Pinochet hearings expected to wrap up, Agence France-Presse, Feb.4, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 540071.
13. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976)
and amendments.
14. Id. § 1603(a) and (b).
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persons. In the context of the present discussion, therefore, could a natural
person who has allegedly committed a human rights violation and is being
sued in a United States court claim that he/she falls within the scope of the
term "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state?"
As defined in the FSIA, the term agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state means any entity,
1. Which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise;
2. Which is an organ of a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof; and
3. Which is neither a citizen of a State of the United
States... nor created under the laws of any third country. 5
As to the legislative history of the section defining this expression, the
House Report explains:
As a general matter, entities which meet the definition of an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state could assume a variety
of forms, including a state trading corporation, a mining
enterprise, a transport organization such as a shipping line or
airline, a steel company, a central bank, an export association, a
governmental procurement agency or a department or ministry
16
This language shows that Congress' primary concern was with
organizations acting for the foreign state. Cases of individuals acting as
sovereign agencies or instrumentalities were not intended to fall within the
scope of the section. As early as 1987 a federal court accepted this reading
of section 1603(b),' 7 and there is further merit to the argument that, section
1603(b) should be interpreted narrowly so as to exclude individuals' claims
to sovereign immunity for human rights violations. Immunities of a
diplomat or a head of state, which I will discuss later, remain, of course,
unaffected under this interpretation. However, several courts, including
the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit,' 8 have instead construed the section
15. Id. § 1603(b).
16. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 6604, 6614.
17. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 665 F.Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
18. See, e.g., EI-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996),
citing Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 19 F.2d 1095, 1099-1103 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Estate
of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 496-97 (9th Cir. 1992); Kline v.
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broadly, thus applying the FSIA to individuals for acts performed in their
official capacity on behalf of a foreign state or its agency or
instrumentality.
The enumerated exceptions to the FSIA, including implied waiver by
the foreign sovereign,' 9 are seemingly unavailing to victims of human
rights violations seeking judicial remedy under the FSIA. Despite merit to
the argument that there could be no immunity under any statute for gross
violations of human rights, an argument rejected by courts," these victims
are limited to finding redress under other statutes. Until 1992 the only
available remedy was under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), a 1789
statute under which "It]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 21
I will not discuss the developments under this statute, for they have
been the subject of extensive treatment ever since the landmark case in
1980 of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala." Suffice it here to note that, while the
United States Supreme Court held in 1989 that the FSIA jurisdictional
criteria apply to suits brought against governments under the ATCA, I the
Court also said that there are no limits that FSIA imposes on lawsuits under
the ATCA.24
Nor will I discuss the developments under the 1992 Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA). I would like to note, however, that in contrast to
the ATCA, under which actions are permitted only by aliens, the TVPA
Kaneko, 685 F.Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Rios v. Marshall, 530 F.Supp. 351, 371-72
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), cases cited in Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 11 n.3.
(D.C. 1998).
19. Section 1605 of the FSIA enumerates seven exceptions. Section 1605(a)(1) provides
that a foreign state shall not be immune from jurisdiction in a U.S. court in any case "in which
the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication.. . " The argument
is that by ratifying or acceding to an international human rights treaty, a state impliedly waives its
sovereign immunity. The courts have, however, rejected this argument. See Furlova v. Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1992).
20. See Siderman, supra note 20; Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F.Supp.
22 (D.D.C. 1992); 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
22. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In a 1995 decision, Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2524 (1996), the Second Circuit
extended the reach of the ATCA to non-state actors for the commission of certain tortious actions
by stating that it does not agree that "the law of nations, as understood in the modern era,
confines its reach to state action." Id. at 239.
23. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.:, 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
24. Id. at 438 (noting that the ATCA "of course has the same effect after the passage of
the FSIA as before with respect to defendants other than foreign states").
25. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 stat. 78 (1992).
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allows United States citizens as well to bring lawsuits in United States
courts. Also, the TVPA allows lawsuits against individual defendants,
contrary to the ATCA which permits suits against individuals as well as
sovereigns, pertaining to a limited number of violations including torture
and extra-judicial killings, subject to the FSIA's jurisdictional
requirements.
Rather, I will confine my comments here to the developments under
the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (Anti-Terrorism
Act),26 under which Congress lifted the immunity of foreign states for
terrorism. United States courts may exercise subject matter jurisdiction
under the Anti-Terrorism Act when the personal injury or death to a U.S.
national has resulted from an act of torture, extra-judicial killing, aircraft
sabotage, or hostage-taking. The harm must have been perpetrated either
directly by the foreign state or by a non-state actor receiving material
support or resources from the foreign state defendant. Also, the foreign
state must be designated by the executive branch as a state sponsor of
terrorism, thus limiting such remedy to a few select states, which currently
include Iran, Cuba, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and North Korea.27
Another limitation under the Anti-Terrorism Act is that if the incident
occurred within the foreign state defendant's territory, the plaintiff must
afford the terrorist state "a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in
accordance with accepted international rules of arbitration.' In addition,
the plaintiff or the victim must be a United States national at the time of the
incident.
Subsequently, an amendment to the Antiterrorism Act aimed at
substantially increasing the potential civil liability of state sponsors of acts
of terrorism was adopted. The amendment titled Civil Liability for Acts of
State Sponsored Terrorism, was enacted on September 30, 1996. Known
as the Flatow Amendment, it was part of the 1997 Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act.29 This amendment specifically provided for the
availability of punitive damages in actions brought under the Anti-
Terrorism Act.
The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia applied the
Anti-Terrorism Act in Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran.30 The plaintiff in
Flatow, was the father of a United States national who died when the bus
on which she was traveling in the Gaza Strip was destroyed by a suicide
bomber. A faction of the Palestine Islamic Jihad, a terrorist organization
26. Pub. L. No. 104-132, Title II, § 221(a)(Apr. 24 1996), 110 stat. 1241, (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1605).
27. 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
29. Pub. L. 104-208, Div. A, Title I § 101 [Title V § 5891 (Sept. 30, 1996), 110 Stat.
3009-172, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note.
30. 999 F. Supp. 1 (1998).
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financed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, claimed responsibility for the
bombing. Since the Islamic Republic of Iran has been designated by the
Department of State as a state sponsor of terrorism, the court found the
defendant Islamic Republic of Iran liable. The court interpreted the Anti-
Terrorism Act retroactively 3 providing the court with subject matter
jurisdiction. The court held that the suicide bombing was an act of extra-
judicial killing. 32  It also found the Act's extraterritorial application
proper.33 The court said that:
[Wihile the Flatow Amendment is apparently an independent
pronouncement of law, yet it has been published as a note to 28
U.S.C. §1605, and requires several references to 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(7) et seq. to reach even a preliminary interpretation. As
it also effects a substantial change to [the Antiterrorism Act], it
appears to be an implied amendment.?
It further added that, [I]nterpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) and
the Flatow Amendment in pari materia demonstrates the coherent
legislative intent behind the two enactments."35
The court held that foreign state sponsors of terrorism were subject to
punitive damages36 and awarded $225 million in addition to several millions
in damages for pain and suffering and for solatiurn.37 The court did not
consider the acts of the terrorist to be valid acts of the state and thereby
exempted from liability under the act of state doctrine,3 8 nor was the
defense of head of state immunity found to be available in such actions
brought pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act.39
IV. ACT OF STATE
The act of state doctrine, a judge-made corollary to sovereign
immunity, was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 1897 in
Underhill v. Hernandez, "[The courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own
31. Id. at 12-14.
32. Id. at 16-19.
33. Id. at 15-16.
34. Id. at 12.
35 999 F. Supp. I at 13 (1998).
36. Id. at 25-27.
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at24.
39. Id. at 24-25.
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territory. "4 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States describes the doctrine as follows:
1. In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement
regarding controlling legal principles, courts in the United States
will generally refrain from... sitting in judgment on... acts of
a governmental character done by a foreign state within its own
territory and applicable there.
2. The doctrine set forth in Subsection (1) is subject to
modification by act of Congress.4'
Thus, under this doctrine, United States courts generally exercise judicial
constraint by declining to review official acts of foreign states.
Individual defendants charged with human rights violations before
United States courts are, however, not likely to succeed in invoking this
doctrine to claim immunity from suit. Courts have generally held that
human rights violations such as torture, assassinations, and summary
executions, do not constitute acts of state, for such acts cannot be
considered public, official acts.42 In Flatow, the court held that the defense
of the act of state is not available in the case of suicide bus bombings and
other acts of international terrorism since they are not "valid acts of state of
the type which [under the act of state doctrine would] bar consideration of
this case."'43
The legislative history of the 1992 Torture Victim Protection Act"
(TVPA) also sheds light on the inapplicability of the act of state doctrine to
human rights violations. In March 1992, Senator Arlen Specter, sponsor
of the TVPA legislation in the Senate, said:
The act of state doctrine does not provide a shield from liability
under the [TVPA]. This doctrine precludes United States courts
from sitting in judgment on the official public acts of a sovereign
government ... Because this doctrine applies only to public
acts, and no foreign government commits torture as a matter of
40. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 443 (1987).
42. See, e.g., Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F.Supp. 297, 301 (N.D. Cal. 1986), 892
F.2d 1419, 1432-34 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1058 (1990); Paul v. Averil, 812
F.Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal.
1987); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.Supp. 665, 673-74 (D.D.C. 1980).
43. Id. at 24.
44. See supra note 24.
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official policy, this doctrine cannot be violated by allowing a
cause of action for torture. 45
The Senate Judiciary Committee's Report on the legislation echoes Senator
Specter's views:
mhe committee does not intend. the act of state doctrine to
provide a shield from lawsuit for [individuals]. In [Sabbatino],
the Supreme Court held that the act of state doctrine is meant to
prevent United States courts from sitting in judgment of the
official public acts of a sovereign foreign government. Since this
doctrine applies only to "public" acts, and no state commits
torture as a matter of public policy, this doctrine cannot shield
[individuals] from liability under this legislation. 46
V. HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY
The FSIA fails to provide guidance regarding head of state immunity,
which is not considered to be a matter of right but rather "a matter of grace
and comity" in United States courts.47 Since such immunity is recognized
as a principle of customary international law,4 and the FSIA remains silent
regarding this immunity, courts have generally deferred to the State
Department's suggestion of immunity. This was done earlier in sovereign
immunity cases prior to the FSIA in deciding whether to grant a foreign
head of state defendant immunity.49 The rationale, of course, is the
primacy of the executive branch regarding foreign affairs.
As noted earlier, some courts including the Ninth and D.C. Circuits,
however, have applied the FSIA to individuals for acts performed in their
official capacity on behalf of a foreign state defendant.' Furthermore,
how are the courts to resolve the controversy when the executive branch
has offered no suggestion at all? To illustrate the unsettled nature of the
scope of head of state immunity, I will refer to three cases: (1) Lafontat
v. Aristide,s' decided in 1994 by the Federal District Court of the Eastern
45. 138 CONG. REC. S2668 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1992).
46. S. REP. NO. 249 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1991).
47. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp 1, 24 (D.C. 1998).
48. See U.S. v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1990) [hereinafter
Noriega].
49. Id.
50. See supra note 17 and the accompanying text.
51. 844 F.Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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District of New York; (2) Hilao v. Marcos,52 from the Ninth Circuit in
1994; and (3) United States v. Noriega,53 a 1997 Eleventh Circuit case.
In Aristide, the plaintiff sought money damages, alleging that Haitian
soldiers who killed her husband acted on behalf of the President of Haiti,
Jean-Bertrand Aristide. At the defendant's request, the State Department
suggested immunity because of his status as the President of Haiti and the
court, accepting the suggestion, dismissed the action.55 It is noteworthy
that Aristide was in exile in the United States at the time of the suit.
In Hilao, the allegations by the families of the deceased who brought
suit against the former president of the Philippines were that, under
Marcos' authority, the victims had been tortured and executed in the
Philippines.56 The Ninth Circuit held that Marcos was not immune because
the acts alleged were not official acts, which would be considered exempt
under head of state immunity. In the court's words "Ferdinand Marcos
was not the state, but the head of the state, bound by the laws that applied
to him. " The court added that a "lawsuit against a foreign official acting
outside the scope of his authority does not implicate any of the foreign
diplomatic concerns involved in bringing suit against another government
in United States courts."58
In the Noriega case, the defendant sought dismissal of his charges of
participation in a drug trafficking conspiracy, claiming Head of State and
diplomatic immunity. 9 Subsequently, Noriega was forcibly brought to the
United States and the court denied his claim of Head of State immunity
because the United States had not recognized him as the head of state of
Panama. 6° He was found guilty by a jury and was sentenced to forty years
in prison.61 On appeal, the court rejected Noriega's claim of immunity
since the executive branch had "manifested its clear sentiment that Noriega
should be denied head-of-state immunity." 62
It should be noted that the circuits had earlier construed the absence of
a formal suggestion of immunity from the Department of State differently.
The Second Circuit decided in In Re Doe,' that "absent a formal
52. Hilao, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 934 (1995).
53. 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997).
.54. Aristide, 844 F.Supp. at 130.
55. Id.
56. Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1469.
57. Id. at 1471 (footnotes omitted).
58. Id. at 1472.
59. United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1510 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
60. Id. at 1519-20.
61. SeeNoriega, 117F.3d 1206, 1210 (ll Cir. 1997).
62. Id. at 1212.
63. 860 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1988).
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suggestion of immunity, a putative head of state should receive no
immunity,"" while the Fifth Circuit held in Spacil v. Crowe,6 that the
judiciary "should make an independent determination regarding immunity
when the Executive Branch neglects to convey clearly its position on a
particular immunity request."6
The Eleventh Circuit has arguably further added to the confusion by
interpreting the executive branch's foreign policy by imputing to it an
intent it had not explicitly expressed. Since the court did not identify
standards to determine the executive's intent, this implicit intent approach
does not to clarify the existing uncertainty in this area.
As a promising new development, however, the Flatow Amendment
provides for the application of the Anti-Terrorism Act's exception of
immunity to "[a]n official, employee, or agent of a foreign state.., acting
within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency." As the
court said in Flatow:
This provision was directed at those individuals who facilitate
terrorist acts which cause the injury or death of American
citizens. The provision does not qualify or in any way limit its
application only to non-heads of state. Given that state
sponsorship of terrorism is a decision made at the highest levels of
government, unless the Flatow Amendment is interpreted as
abrogating head of state immunity in the limited circumstances of
[the Antiterrorism Act], the provisions cannot give full effect to
Congressional intent, and the federal cause of action created by
the two amendments would be irreparably and unreasonably
hobbled. This Court therefore concludes that the defense of head
of state immunity is not available in actions brought pursuant to
[the Anti-Terrorist Act and the Flatow Amendment].67
VI. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
One of the most ancient principles of customary international law,
diplomatic immunity, is now enshrined in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations,6 which was codified in 1978 in the United States in
64. Id. at45, cited in Noriega, 117F.3dat 1212.
65. 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. Id. at618-19, cited in Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1212.
67. Flatow, V. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 24-25 (D.C. 1998).
68. 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter the Vienna
Convention].
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the Diplomatic Relations Act.' The Convention regulates the conduct of
diplomats within the receiving state. Article 41 provides:
1. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the
duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to
respect the laws and regulations of the Receiving State...
2. All official business with the receiving State entrusted to the
mission by the sending State shall be conducted with or through
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Receiving State or such
other ministry as may be agreed.
3. The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner
incompatible with the functions of the mission...
Diplomatic privileges and immunities are justified under the functional
necessity theory so as to enable the mission to perform its functions.
However, instances of abuse by diplomats asserting immunity, ranging
from violation of traffic laws to serious human rights abuses, are
commonplace. There have been several proposals and some attempts to
curb those abuses by amending the Vienna Convention. 70  However, for
present purposes, diplomatic immunity does not raise any special problems
that have not already been subsumed under the prior discussion.
VII. CONCLUSION
Immunities law still shields perpetrators of human rights abuses from
lawsuits in United States courts to an unacceptable extent. The law
remains uncertain and, as the Pinochet case demonstrates, a similar
situation prevails in Britain and presumably in other countries as well.
Starting with the dusting off of the 200-year-old ATCA and its application
in Filartiga and the subsequent expansion through the TVPA and the Anti-
Terrorism Act and Flatow Amendment, as discussed earlier, victims are
able to seek redress in limited circumstances.
Thus, the need remains to provide a human rights exception in the
FSIA to allow the law to catch up with the monumental progress of
international human rights law. The attempts thus far have not succeeded
in taking this next step forward, but the opportunity and the demand are
both present for doing so.71
69. Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. §§ 251-59. Pub. L. 95-393, 92 Stat.
808, codified in 22 U.S.C. sec. 254a-e and 28 U.S.C. § 1364.
70. See generally Michael B. McDonough, Privileged Outlaws: Diplomats, Crime and
Immunity, 20 SUFr-OLK TRANS-NAT'L L. REv. 475 (1997).
71. There is voluminous literature addressing the shortcomings and recommending
specific action. For several such proposals, see, e.g., Jeffrey Jacobson, Trying to Fit a Square
Peg Into a Round Hole: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Hwnan Rights Violations, 19
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